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Abstract
Recently Bu and Wang [1] proposed a simple modulation method aiming to im-
prove the security of chaos-based secure communications against return-map-based
attacks. Soon this modulation method was independently cryptanalyzed by Chee et
al. [2], Wu et al. [3], and A´lvarez et al. [4] via different attacks. As an enhancement
to the Bu-Wang method, an improving scheme was suggested by Wu et al. [3] by re-
moving the relationship between the modulating function and the zero-points. The
present paper points out that the improved scheme proposed in [3] is still insecure
against a new attack. Compared with the existing attacks, the proposed attack is
more powerful and can also break the original Bu-Wang scheme. Furthermore, it is
pointed out that the security of the scheme proposed in [3] is not so satisfactory
from a pure cryptographical point of view. The synchronization performance of this
class of modulation-based schemes is also discussed.
1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the use of chaotic systems in cryptography has been
extensively investigated. There are two main classes of chaotic cryptosystems:
analog [5, 6] and digital [7]. Most analog chaotic cryptosystems are secure
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communication systems based on synchronization of the sender and the re-
ceiver chaotic systems [8], where a signal is transmitted over a public channel
from the sender to the receiver, and decryption of the plain-signal is realized
via chaos synchronization at the receiver end. According to the encryption
structures, most analog chaos-based secure communication systems can be
classified into four categories: chaotic masking [9, 10], chaotic switching or
chaotic shift keying (CSK) [11, 12], chaotic modulation [13, 14], and chaotic
inverse system [15]. Meanwhile, some cryptanalysis work has also been de-
veloped, and many different attacks have been proposed to break different
types of chaos-based secure communication systems: return-map-based at-
tacks [16–18], spectral analysis attacks [19, 20], generalized-synchronization-
based attacks [21, 22], short-time-period-based attacks [23, 24], prediction-
based attacks [25, 26], parameter-identification-based attacks [27–30], and so
on.
Since many early chaos-based secure communication systems are found inse-
cure against various attacks, how to design robust chaos-based secure commu-
nication systems against the existing attacks is always a real challenge. The
following three types of countermeasures have been proposed in the litera-
ture: 1) using more complex dynamical systems, such as hyperchaotic systems
or multiple cascaded heterogeneous chaotic systems [31]; 2) introducing tra-
ditional ciphers into chaotic cryptosystems [32]; 3) introducing an impulsive
(also named sporadic) driving signal instead of a continuous signal to real-
ize modulation and synchronization [33]. The first countermeasure was found
lately remaining insecure against some specific attacks [26,28,34,35], and some
security defects of the second have also been reported [36].
In [1], a simple modulation method was proposed by Bu and Wang to enhance
the security of some chaos-based secure communications against return-map-
based attacks. A periodic signal is used to modulate the transmitted signal
in order to effectively blur the reconstructed return map. Although this mod-
ulation method can frustrate return-map-based attacks, it was soon broken
independently in [2–4] with other different attacks, some of which rely on
the embedded periodicity of zero-crossing points of the modulating signal. To
further improve the security of the original Bu-Wang modulation method, a
modified modulating signal was then suggested in [3] to cancel the embedding
regular occurrence of zero-crossing points in the transmitted signal.
This paper points out that the modified modulation method proposed in [3]
is still insecure against a new attack that cab restore the return map. The
secret parameters of the modulating signal can be approximately identified
via the proposed attack. Compared with other attacks, the new attack is
more powerful which can also break the original Bu-Wang modulation scheme.
Furthermore, it will be pointed out that from a cryptographical point of view
the modulation method itself is not so satisfactory in enhancing the security of
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the chaotic cryptosystems even when the modulating signal is secure enough.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, the modulation method
and related attacks are briefly introduced. Section 3 shows how the new attack
breaks the scheme based on the modified modulation method. Some general
discussions on practical performance of this class of modulation-based methods
under study are given in Sec. 4. The last section concludes the paper.
2 The modulation method and related attacks
To introduce the modulation-based method, the Lorenz system is used to
construct a secure communication system. The sender system is
x˙1 =σ(x2 − x1),
x˙2 = rx1 − x2 − x1x3, (1)
x˙3 =x1x2 − bx3
and the receiver system is
y˙1=σ(y2 − y1) + c(s(x, t)− s(y, t)),
y˙2= ry1 − y2 − y1y3, (2)
y˙3= y1y2 − by3,
where σ, b, r are parameters of the system, x = (x1, x2, x3) and y = (y1, y2, y3)
are state variables, c denotes the coupling strength, and s(x, t) = g(t)x1(t)
is the ciphertext transmitted over the public channel for information carry-
ing and chaos synchronization. Accordingly, s(y, t) = g(t)y1(t). In [1], g(t)
is selected as the product of a cosine signal and another system variable:
g(t) = A cos(ωt+φ0)x3(t). When the above system runs in a chaotic masking
configuration, s(x, t) = g(t)x1(t) + i(t), where i(t) is the plain-message signal.
In the above secure communication system, the secret key consists of the
system parameters of the Lorenz system (σ, b, r) and the parameters of the
modulating signal (ω, φ0). Note that A should not be used as part of the key,
since it does not influence the shape of the return map (just change the size).
To facilitate the following discussion, without loss of generality, the parameters
are fixed as the default parameters used in [1]: σ = 16, r = 45.6, b = 4.0,
A = 0.5, ω = 1.5, φ0 = 0. In the chaotic masking configuration, the plain-
message signal is assumed to be i(t) = 0.1 sin(t); in the chaotic switching
configuration, the value of b switches between b0 = 4.0 and b1 = 4.4.
The purpose of using g(t) is to frustrate return-map-based attacks, proposed
3
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Fig. 1. Return maps (An vs Bn, the same thereinafter) reconstructed under different
conditions.
previously in [16]. In common chaotic masking systems, s(x, t) = x1(t) + i(t),
where i(t) is the plain-message signal whose energy is much smaller than that
of x1(t); and in common chaotic switching systems, s(x, t) = x1(t). Following
[16], two return maps, An vs Bn and (−Cn) vs (−Dn), are defined as follows:
An =
Xn+Yn
2
, Bn = Xn−Yn, Cn = Xn+1+Yn2 , Dn = Yn−Xn+1, where Xn and Ym
are the n-th (local) maxima and the m-th (local) minima of the transmitted
signal, respectively. Since the An vs Bn map is identical to the (−Cn) vs (−Dn)
map, in this paper only the former will be considered. Once an attacker gets
the An vs Bn return map, he can use the attack method proposed in [16] to
break both the chaotic masking and the chaotic switching systems.
In Fig. 1, some return maps reconstructed under different conditions are
shown, from which it seems that the modulating function g(t) = A cos(ωt +
φ0)x3(t) can effectively blur the return maps and so frustrate the attackers.
However, as pointed out in [2,3], the modulating signal will introduce regular
zero-crossing points in the transmitted signal g(t), which makes it possible to
distinguish the value of ω via spectral analysis [2] or autocorrelation analy-
sis [3]. Also, it was shown in [4] that the power spectrum of |s(x, t)| can be
used to estimate the value of ω. Moreover, the value of φ0 can be simulta-
neously obtained via autocorrelation analysis [3] or separately by detecting
zero-crossing points at intervals equal to π
4ω
[4]. A direct extraction of the bi-
nary plain-message signal from the transmitted signal has also been discussed
in [4] for the chaotic switching configuration.
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To resist the proposed attacks, a modified modulating signal was suggested
in [3]: g(t) = A(cos(ωt + φ0) +M)x3(t), where M > 1. It was claimed that
such a simple modification can eliminate the security defect of the original
scheme and can also improve the synchronization performance. The default
parameters of the modified scheme are identical to the ones used in the original
Bu-Wang scheme, except φ0 = 0.3.
3 Breaking the scheme based on the modified modulation method
In this section, we show that the modified modulation method proposed in [3]
can still be easily broken via a new attack, which is designed based on param-
eter estimation from the transmitted signal s(x, t). It will be shown that the
proposed attack works for both chaotic masking and chaotic switching config-
urations. The most significant feature of the new attack is its independence
of the zero-crossing points and its robustness with respect to different values
of ω, φ0 and M . This new attack is also able to break the original Bu-Wang
scheme. This paper further points out that the modulation method itself is not
very satisfactory from a cryptographical point of view, even if the modulating
signal itself can be designed to be extremely secure against attacks.
3.1 Breaking the values of ω and φ0
Assuming g0(t) = A(cos(ωt+φ0)+M), where M > 1 implies g0(t) > 0. Thus,
|s(x, t)| = |g0(t)x3(t)x1(t)| = g0(t)|x3(t)x1(t)|, which means that the ampli-
tude of |x3(t)x1(t)| is periodically modulated by g0(t) at a fixed frequency
ω. Consequently, there exists an embedded periodicity in the amplitude of
|s(x, t)|, just like the embedded periodicity in the zero-crossing points dis-
cussed in [2–4]. See Figs. 2a and b for a comparison of the waveforms of
s(x, t), |s(x, t)| and g0(t), in the chaotic masking configuration with i(t) = 0,
where the waveforms of s(x, t) and |s(x, t)| have been normalized to make
the display clearer. One can see that the periodicity occurs as a clear en-
velop of the amplitude of |s(x, t)|. After filtering |s(x, t)| with an averaging
filter, one can dramatically refine the periodicity, as shown in Fig. 2c, where
s¯(x, t) = |s(x, t)|⊛ fa(t, 4) has also been normalized for a better display and
the employed averaging filter fa(t, h) is defined as follows:
fa(t, h) =


1− (|t|/h), |t| ≤ h,
0, |t| > h. (3)
Here, ⊛ denotes the convolution operation and the value of h should be chosen
close to ω to get a smooth filtered signal s¯(x, t). For this purpose, a rough
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estimation of ω can be easily obtained from |s(x, t)| as shown in Fig. 2b. Note
that any other averaging filter may be used instead of the above triangular
one.
From Fig. 2c, it is clear that one can easily get an accurate estimation of ω and
φ0, thanks to the global phase matching between s¯(x, t) and g0(t). Of course,
some other estimation algorithms, such as the autocorrelation identification
method proposed in [3], can be employed to further improve the accuracy
of the estimation. When a plain-message signal is carried in the transmitted
signal s(x, t), the above estimation algorithm still works well as shown in Fig.
2d, which is attributed to the sufficiently small energy of the plain-message
signal. Also, it is obvious that the above algorithm works well for the chaotic
switching configuration (see Fig. 3 for a breaking result).
From the above discussion, it seems that the performance of the proposed
estimation will gradually decrease as ω increases, since the averaging filter
fa(t, h) may produce unsatisfactory results. This looks like a defect of the pro-
posed attack. However, our experiments show that when ω is relatively large,
it becomes possible to directly estimate the values of ω and φ0 from |s(x, t)|
only (even without using average filtering). When ω = 13.6 1 , for example,
the waveforms of |s(x, t)|, s¯(x, t) and g0(t) are shown in Fig. 4, where the pa-
rameter of the averaging filter is chosen as h = 0.2. Note that the positions of
local minima of |s(x, t)| coincide very well with those of g0(t), although s¯(x, t)
becomes less clear. This demonstrates that the proposed attack method is
rather robust to different values of ω and φ0.
It is worth mentioning that the value of ω can also be derived via spectral
analysis: simply, calculating the power spectrum of s¯(x, t) and extracting the
spectrum peak at the frequency ω. In fact, such a direct spectral analysis
for estimating ω works even without using average filtering, as shown in [4].
This is because the following property of Lorenz-like chaotic systems [24, 37]:
although x1(t) of the Lorenz system has a wideband spectrum as shown in
Fig. 5a, the absolute-valued signal |x1(t)| has a prominent spectrum peak at an
inherent frequency fz, which is uniquely determined by the system parameters
σ, b and r and is independent of the initial conditions. See Fig. 5b for the
power spectrum of |x1(t)|. This is also true for x2(t). For x3(t), the operation
is even simpler: x3(t) itself has a prominent spectrum peak at the inherent
frequency fz. This implies that |s(x, t)| = g0(t)|x3(t)x1(t)| will have at least
two prominent spectrum peaks, at fz and fω =
ω
2π
(Hz), respectively. See Figs.
5c and d for a comparison of the power spectra of s(x, t) and |s(x, t)|. It can be
1 This value is intentionally set to be identical to the inherent frequency 2πfz of
the Lorenz system, so as to emphasize on the robustness of the proposed attack.
Some explanations of the inherent frequency of the Lorenz system are given in the
following paragraphs.
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Fig. 2. Breaking the values of ω and φ0 in the chaotic masking configuration, where
and throughout the paper the dashed line is g0(t).
seen that the first prominent peak is at the frequency fω and the second at fz.
Apparently, ω can also be obtained from fω as ω = 2πfω. Following [24, 37],
such an inherent frequency also exists in Chua and Ro¨ssler systems, so the
same spectral analysis is also available for attacking these two chaotic systems
widely-used in chaos-based secure communications. At present, it is not clear
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Fig. 4. Breaking the values of ω and φ0 in the chaotic masking configuration.
whether there exists any chaotic system that has no distinguishable inherent
frequency.
Compared with the spatial attack proposed above, the existing spectral attack
has some defects: 1) it cannot work well when ω ≈ fz; 2) the value of φ0
cannot be simultaneously estimated with ω in the frequency domain; 3) if
there does not exist a strong DC component in |x3(t)x1(t)| (e.g., if some other
chaotic systems are also used), fω will not occur as a prominent peak in
the power spectrum 2 ; 4) when other chaotic systems are used instead of the
Lorenz system, the inherent frequency may not exist (though unlikely) or the
frequency fω might not be easily identified from the power spectra.
2 Although fz± fω always occur as two minor peaks, they are generally less distin-
guishable than the individual major peaks at fω and fz, respectively.
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Fig. 5. The relative power spectra of x1(t), |x1(t)|, s(x, t) and |s(x, t)|.
Finally, let us see how the proposed attack works on the original Bu-Wang
scheme, where the condition is somewhat different since g0(t) = A cos(ωt+φ0)
is not always positive. In that case, one has
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Fig. 6. Breaking the values of ω and φ0 in the original Bu-Wang scheme, where the
dashed line denotes either g0(t) or |g0(t)|.
|s(x, t)|=A| cos(ωt+ φ0)| · |x3(t)x1(t)|
=
A√
2
·
√
1 + cos(2ωt+ 2φ0) · |x3(t)x1(t)|.
Thus, with the above-described attack we will get 2ω and 2φ0, which can
be easily halved to obtain the values of ω and φ0. In Fig. 6, the result of
breaking the chaotic masking configuration with i(t) = 0 of the original Bu-
Wang scheme is shown, where a different averaging filter, f ′a(t, 1), is used to
make s¯(x, t) smoother:
f ′a(t, h) =


1 + cos
(
2πt
2h
)
, |t| ≤ h
0, |t| > h. (4)
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From the above analysis, one can see that the attack proposed in this subsec-
tion can work for not only the original Bu-Wang scheme but also some other
scheme if the modulating signal g0(t) is periodic (which need not be a simple
sinusoidal or cosine signal). Therefore, an aperiodic or even chaotic modulat-
ing signal g0(t) has to be used to enhance the security. However, in this case
the synchronization of the modulating signal itself becomes a new problem,
which will be further discussed in Sec. 4.2.
3.2 Breaking the value of M
Once the values of ω and φ0 are known, one can further break the value of M
via an iterative process, and then get rid of the blurring effect on the return
map by removing g0(t) from s(x, t). To do so, define an auxiliary signal
sˆ(x, t) =
s(x, t)
cos(ωt+ φ0) +M ′
=
cos(ωt+ φ0) +M
cos(ωt+ φ0) +M ′
·Ax3(t)x1(t), (5)
where M ′ is an estimation of M . Apparently, it is expected that the closer the
value of M ′ is to M , the closer the signal sˆ(x, t) is to xˆ13(t) = Ax3(t)x1(t). As
a natural result, if M ′ changes from a value larger than M to a value smaller
thanM , i.e., (M ′ > M)→ (M ′ < M), the behavior of sˆ(x, t) will gradually go
closer to xˆ13(t) and then turn gradually far away from xˆ13(t) once M
′ crosses
the point M ′ = M . Therefore, there exists a global minimum at the point
M ′ = M . The existence of such a global minimum can be easily checked by
observing the reconstructed return map from sˆ(x, t) or |sˆ(x, t)|. In Fig. 7, the
return maps constructed from |sˆ(x, t)| with respect to different values of M ′
are shown. The reason why |sˆ(x, t)| is used is that this reconstructed return
map has a simpler structure than the map reconstructed from sˆ(x, t). The
following features can be found from the maps:
(1) The closer the value ofM ′ is to M , the thinner the branch width and the
closer the return map reconstructed from |sˆ(x, t)| is to the return map
from |xˆ13(t)|.
(2) The shape of the return map is related to the relation betweenM ′ andM :
the two edges of the right-bottom branch are both clear when M ′ > M ,
while only the left edge is clear when M ′ < M . When M ′ is closer to
M , the above characteristic is a little different: the right edge is (not so
much) clearer than the left one when M ′ > M , while the left edge is
much clearer than the right one when M ′ < M .
The first feature above means that one can approximately know the distance
between M ′ and M by measuring the width of the right-bottom branch of the
return map, and the second feature means that one can exactly know whether
M ′ > M orM ′ < M . Note that the branch width and the clearness of the two
11
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Fig. 7. Return maps reconstructed from |sˆ(x, t)| with different values of M ′.
edges of the right-bottom branch can be quantitatively defined by different
methods. For example, some algorithms can be used to extract the skeleton
and the two edges of the branch, and then determine the two measures. In
fact, in real attacks, an attacker can directly get a rough estimation of the
measures by naked eye, and then manually carry out the following iterative
algorithm for several times to find a sufficiently accurate estimation of M .
Given a lower bound M− < M and an upper bound M+ > M , the iterative
algorithm is as follows:
• Step 1 – Initialization: Set i = 1,M (i)
−
= M−,M
(i)
+ =M+, and determine the
number of iterative rounds, m (which is used to achieve a desired precision,
as further explained later).
• Step 2 : Among the following n+ 1 values,

M ′i,j =M (i)− + j ·
(
M
(i)
+ −M (i)−
)
n


n
j=0
, (6)
12
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
a) The return map reconstructed
from |sˆ(x, t)|
−800 −600 −400 −200 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
b) The return map reconstructed
from sˆ(x, t)
Fig. 8. The return maps reconstructed from |sˆ(x, t)| and sˆ(x, t) whenM ′ = M+0.01
in the chaotic switching configuration.
find two consecutive ones satisfying M ′i,j−1 < M and M
′
i,j > M .
• Step 3 : If i ≤ m, then increase i by 1, set M (i)
−
= M ′i,j−1, M
(i)
+ = M
′
i,j ,
and goto Step 2; otherwise, stop the algorithm and output an estimation
M˜ =
M ′
i,j−1
+M ′
i,j
2
.
Apparently, the above iterative algorithm is rather similar to the numerical al-
gorithms for solving algebraic equations for roots [38]. It can be easily deduced
that the estimation accuracy afterm rounds is
∣∣∣M˜ −M ∣∣∣ ≤ M+−M−
2nm
. To achieve
a predefined accuracy ǫ > 0, it is required that M+−M−
2nm
≤ ǫ, and then one gets
m ≥ log2(M+−M−)−log2(2ǫ)
log2 n
. Taking m =
⌈
log2(M+−M−)−log2(2ǫ)
log2 n
⌉
, the complexity
of the above iterative algorithm is only O(nm) = O
(
n · log2(M+−M−)−log2(2ǫ)
log2 n
)
,
which is sufficiently small for an attacker to carry out the algorithm manu-
ally. When n = 3, the computing complexity is minimized, since the integer
function f(n) = n
log2 n
(n ≥ 2) reaches the global minimum at n = 3.
Although in theory the above algorithm can get an arbitrarily accurate esti-
mation by increasing the round number m, the distinguishability of the return
map reconstructed from a finite set of data will be insufficient when M ′ is too
close to M . Fortunately, in this case, the return map will be sufficiently clear
for an intruder to carry out the return-map-based attacks. Figure 8 shows the
return map reconstructed from |sˆ(x, t)| and sˆ(x, t) when M ′ = M + 0.01 in
the chaotic switching configuration. It can be seen that such an accuracy is
enough to break the 0/1-bits in the plain-message signal.
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4 Discussions on the performance of the modulation-based meth-
ods
4.1 A cryptographical perspective
From a cryptographical point of view, a modulating signal is not an effective
tool for enhancing the security of chaos-based secure communications, due to
the dependence of the secret parameters of the chaotic systems on the se-
cret parameters of the modulating signal. In fact, to break the whole chaotic
cryptosystem via a brute-force attack, what an attacker should do is to ex-
haustively guess the secret parameters of the modulating signal, not all secret
parameters (system parameters and modulating parameters). This means that
the key space of the whole system is reduced to be max(Km, Kc), i.e., to be
Km when Km > Kc, where Km is the key space of the modulating signal and
Kc is the key space of the chaotic cryptosystem without modulation. However,
for a good encryption algorithm, the key space should be always Km×Kc [39].
To further enhance the modulation-based method, the modulating operation
should be non-invertible, i.e., expressing s(x, t) = F (g0(t),x), the function
F (·, ·) should be non-invertible with respect to x. However, with such a com-
plicated modulating mechanism, the synchronization between the sender and
the receiver may become much more difficult and be impossible under practical
conditions (see the next subsection for further discussion on synchronization
issues).
4.2 The synchronization performance
In [3], it was found that “almost no value can achieve the synchronization
when M = 0”, i.e., when the original Bu-Wang scheme [1] is used. Our experi-
ments support this claim. Furthermore, when g0(t) = A cos(ωt+φ0), Matlab’s
numerical differentiation function, ode45 used in this work, fails (i.e., enters
into a dead lock) with a high probability for many values of c. This implies
that the original synchronization scheme proposed in [1] is ill-behaved in most
cases.
It can be confirmed that chaos synchronization of the modified scheme sug-
gested in [3] can be achieved for a large range of values of c. This means
that the modification in [3] really enhances the synchronization performance.
For verification, a number of experiments were carried out to study the syn-
chronization performance when g0(t) is replaced by some other functions. As
a surprising result, it was found that even a non-negative noise signal can
make the receiver system synchronized well with the sender system. Figure
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Fig. 9. The synchronization errors of the three system variables when
g0(t) = rand(t) ∈ (0, 1): |y1(t) − x1(t)|, |y2(t) − x2(t)| and |y3(t) − x3(t)| (from
top to bottom).
9 shows the experimental result when g0(t) = rand(t) ∈ (0, 1) and c = 10.
Some other signals were also tested, for example, g0(t) = t
2 mod 1 and g0(t) =
(t cos(ωt+φ0)) mod 1, and it was found that chaos synchronization is achieved
in both cases. At present, the reason behind this unexpected synchronization
phenomenon is still not clear.
5 Conclusion
In [1], a simple modulation-based method was proposed to improve the secu-
rity of chaos-based secure communications against return-map-based attacks.
Soon this scheme was independently cryptanalyzed in [2–4] via different at-
tacks. Then, in [3], a modified modulation-based scheme was proposed to
enhance the security of the original one. This paper proposes a new attack
to break the new modified scheme. Compared with previous attacks, the pro-
posed attack is more powerful and can also break the original scheme in [1].
Based on all analysis and experimental results, the conclusion is that, from a
15
cryptographical point of view, the security of this class of modulation-based
scheme is not satisfactory for secure communications.
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